Abstract-Traditionally, spread-spectrum systems have been employed to provide low probability-of-intercept (LPI), low probability-of-detection (LPD) performance at the physical layer, but the messages transmitted over such a system are still encrypted with a powerful cipher to protect their secrecy. However, it has recently been suggested that the cryptographic security of the system can be enhanced by exploiting physical properties of ultra-wideband (UWB) signals. With an eavesdropper observing the communications over multipath channels between two legitimate partners sharing a secret key of a limited length, we consider both coherent and reference-based UWB schemes to enhance security. The security of the legitimate nodes is achieved by signal attributes based on the secret key, giving them an advantage over the adversary. In particular, we propose transmission schemes and investigate the physical layer security performance of UWB systems intended for coherent reception and UWB transmitted-reference (TR) systems in IEEE 802.15.4a multipath environments. Critical to the TR scheme is employing true randomness to keep a sophisticated adversary from decoding the signal coherently. Numerical results for IEEE 802.15.4a channel models reveal not only that the proposed schemes provide promising support for higher-layer cryptographic protocols, but also, perhaps surprisingly, that the baseline UWB TR system can demonstrate better security tradeoffs than the baseline UWB system intended for coherent reception under the IEEE 802.15.4a channel model.
I. INTRODUCTION
In general, encryption for securing information in wireless systems is done at the digital layer with powerful ciphers. However, it has been suggested that some level of cryptographic security can be assured at the physical layer by utilizing the physical characteristics of wideband signals [1] , [2] . This might be highly desirable in extremely low-power applications (e.g. radio frequency identification (RFID)) where it is not possible to run powerful encryption algorithms and, hence, marrying a lighter-weight cryptographic protocol to an enhancing physical layer is attractive. Furthermore, there is increasing demand for portable devices providing high data rates at lower power for short range wireless applications. Accordingly, ultra-wideband (UWB) communication systems have attracted considerable attention both because of their extremely low-power architecture which avoids interference at conventional receivers and a potentially robust physical layer security.
Among possible receiver implementations in UWB systems, coherent UWB communication systems are regarded as superior to noncoherent UWB systems in performance but at the expense of significant complexity. Noncoherent UWB systems can provide a simpler receiver structure by avoiding the complicated channel estimation caused by the extreme bandwidth. The performance of coherent and noncoherent UWB systems has been analyzed [3] , [4] . However, to the best of our knowledge, there have been no studies investigating the ability of UWB systems to support higher-layer cryptographic protocols. In particular, the tradeoff between security performance and receiver complexity in multipath fading channels has not yet been examined.
In this paper we propose a UWB signaling model to enhance secure transmission by utilizing physical properties of UWB signals. The proposed signaling model is based on a timehopping (TH) method and binary pulse amplitude modulation. It is assumed that a randomly generated secret key is shared by two communicating parties, e.g., an RFID tag and a legitimate receiver. This shared key is used to determine the UWB pulse locations. The utility of the proposed UWB signaling model is based on the legitimate receiver identifying the pulse locations through the secret key, thus conferring an advantage over any adversary which has no knowledge of the time slots employed to transmit a data bit. We examine the security performance in terms of the ability of the legitimate receiver to decode data versus the ability of the eavesdropper to ascertain the key as motivated by potential cryptographic protocols [5] .
We derive the error probabilities of both the legitimate UWB receiver and adversary when the transmission is intended for coherent reception, and then those of the legitimate UWB receiver and adversary when the transmission is intended for reference-based reception. Since the quantities of interest are in an integral form, analytical evaluation is very difficult. Accordingly, we present numerical results for systems operating in IEEE 802.15.4a environments [6] . The physical layer security performance of the baseline system intended for reference-based reception is unexpectedly better than that of the baseline system intended for coherent reception, because an architecture which forces noncoherent detection handicaps the adversary as well as the intended receiver. Finally, we discuss our proposed schemes as a possible solution for the near-far problem that plagues PHY-based security in the wireless environment and consider ways to further improve security of signal transmission using the UWB schemes.
The proposed scheme may offer a potentially effective solution for applications which rely on conventional cryptography Fig. 1 . UWB signaling scheme for intended coherent reception for secure communications. In particular, the proposed UWB signaling schemes can be adapted to a low-data rate RFID system with a simple tag but with a reader of higher complexity, thereby making available possible UWB TR approaches and perhaps coherent approaches, both of which would be difficult in low-power integrated circuits [7] .
II. SYSTEM MODEL Given peak power constraints on UWB hardware, particularly in emerging CMOS technologies with small feature sizes, there will often be a large number of short UWB pulses to convey a data bit [3] , [8] . Assume that a randomly generated b-bit secret key K is shared by a transmitter and a legitimate receiver. A single user that employs a TH method and binary pulse amplitude modulation will be assumed throughout this paper. Without loss of generality, a signal carrying the first data bit b 0 mapped to {−1, 1} with equal probability in the first symbol period is considered.
A. UWB signaling scheme intended for coherent reception
We employ the b-bit secret key K to position the UWB pulses within the symbol period T s . In contrast to traditional spread-spectrum systems, we do not employ a shift register with connections determined by the key to produce a longer pseudo-random noise (PN) sequence, since this does not improve the cryptographic strength of the system [9] . Fig.  1 illustrates a UWB signaling scheme intended for coherent detection. Ideally, each pulse would be independently located using key bits, but keys are generally not long enough to support such. Hence, we divide the b-bit shared key K into m parts K = (κ 1 , κ 2 , ..., κ m ) to utilize the limited key bits, and each κ i consisting of b/m bits, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., m}, is used to select a position index in {0, 1, ..., 2 b/m − 1} that is shared by the pulses in the corresponding N f /m frames.
More formally, a transmitted signal s 0 (t) carrying the first information bit b 0 over the first symbol period as shown in Fig. 1 is considered, and the signal transmitted by a single user can be expressed by:
where p(·) is a normalized standard UWB pulse of approximate duration T p and
The transmission energy of each pulse is E p = E s /N f where E s is the symbol energy and N f is the number of frames in one symbol period. The symbol period Fig. 2 . UWB signaling scheme for intended TR reception period, and
k=1 is the TH sequence. Specifically, the TH code element c 0, k/m ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2 b/m − 1} for positioning the UWB pulse in the kth frame is determined by the b/m key bits κ k/m +1 . Hence, the pulse location in frames 0, 1, ..., m − 1 is determined by κ 1 , the pulse location in frames m, m + 1, ..., 2m − 1 is determined by κ 2 , etc. Fig. 2 illustrates the UWB TR signaling scheme, where each frame consists of two pulses: a reference pulse and a data pulse. A transmitted signal s 0,tr (t) of a UWB TR system over the first symbol interval can be written as:
B. UWB TR signaling scheme
where the previous parameters specified in (1) hold in (2) . In frame k, the reference pulse is transmitted first and the data pulse follows with a delay D + c 0, k/m T p . Thus, unlike the UWB signaling scheme for coherent reception shown in Fig. 1 , the key bits κ i are used to determine not the data pulse locations but rather the time delay c 0, k/m T p between the reference pulse and the data pulse. Thus, the time delay c 0, k/m T p in each group of N f /m frames remains invariant. The fixed time delay D, D > τ max , is employed to prevent inter-pulse interference between the reference pulse and the data pulse after passing through the channel, where τ max is the maximum delay spread of the channel. The variable τ k indicates the starting time of the reference pulse in the kth frame, which varies in a true random manner in the proposed UWB TR signaling scheme. For example, although a time separation c 0,0 T p between the reference and data pulses determined by the first key bits κ 1 is constant in the first N f /m frames, the actual location in each frame will vary according to the random offsets. These random offsets keep the UWB TR adversary from detecting the transmitted signal coherently by using the reference pulse to estimate channel information. Note that a transmitter can generate this true random location with extremely low-power circuitry (0.57 pJ/bit) [10] , and that a TR receiver does not require knowledge of the offset τ k (and, hence, these random bits) to decode the signal.
III. PERFORMANCE OF SYSTEMS INTENDED FOR COHERENT RECEPTION
Consider the transmission of the signal s 0 (t) over a frequency-selective multipath channel appropriate for the wire-less UWB system. The channel impulse response will be given by a standard discrete-path model as:
where h l denotes the attenuation factor, τ l is the time delay associated with the lth propagation path, and L is the number of multipath components. Assume that the channel is timeinvariant over one symbol period so that all of the pulses in a symbol period will go through the same channel. The received signal can be expressed as:
where n(t) is a zero-mean white Gaussian noise with twosided power spectral density N 0 /2.
A. Legitimate Receiver
Since precise timing is required by the legitimate receiver, we will assume that beacons have allowed for timing and channel estimation for both the legitimate UWB receiver and adversary. A template signal perfectly matched to the pulse sequence of the received signal in the first symbol period is given in by:
Assuming a maximal ratio combining approach, the decision statistic after combining the outputs of the correlators can be written as:
where
is Gaussiandistributed with zero mean and variance
Thus, the decoding error probability for the legitimate receiver with knowledge of the data pulse locations when conditioned on
l=0 is given in [11] by:
B. Adversary
Since a UWB signal at a low power level is buried in noise, finding the information data pulse can be very challenging without knowledge of the pulse locations. In order to provide a lower bound on security performance, we consider the worst case scenario to the legitimate receiver where the adversary knows the transmitted bit. This might occur, for example, if the adversary is able to exploit some sort of packet structure. More formally, consider the first N f /m frames, where data pulses are located at the identical time slot in each frame, and thus a template signal when the pulse is in the time slot i is given by: (8) where i ∈ {0, 1, ..., 2 b/m − 1}. Assuming the adversary uses the maximal ratio combining technique, the decision statistic after combining the outputs of the correlators for the first N f /m frames is given by:
is Gaussian-distributed with zero mean and variance
The adversary has to confront a large number of hypotheses, since there is only one data pulse but many empty slots in each frame due to the extreme bandwidth expansion. We assume the adversary employs the template at various delays, and picks the output with the largest value.
The adversary with the assumed knowledge of the channel could instead perform a sophisticated hypothesis test, but our main conclusion is based on the adversary performing well in the coherent case, and thus a lower bound to the adversary performance suffices. Noting
0, otherwise and
the probability of finding the correct pulse position in the first N f /m frames conditioned upon {h l } L−1 l=0 is easily extended from the coherent reception of orthogonal signals [12] :
Since the TH codes for each group of N f /m frames are independently assigned by each of κ 1 , κ 2 , ..., κ m , the probability of error of the adversary for finding the entire key is obtained by averaging over the channel realization:
Note that partial keys also yield some utility to the adversary, since they weaken the system security if key refresh schemes are not employed, but we adopt the probability of obtaining the whole key since partial key capture can be combatted at higher layers.
IV. PERFORMANCE OF TR SYSTEMS
For performance analysis, assume the channel is constant over the symbol period, although we hasten to note that the system functions well if the channel is constant only over the frame duration so that the reference pulse in each frame goes through the same channel as the data pulse. The maximum delay spread of the channel τ max is assumed to be smaller than the minimal separation D in order to avoid interference between the reference and data pulses, and T f is assumed large enough to assure no inter-frame interference. Note that these assumptions are easily satisfied in the relatively low-data rate RFID applications envisioned.
The received signal passes through a noise-limiting low-pass filter with sufficiently wide bandwidth W at the front end of the receiver. The filtered received signal is given by:
wherer 0,tr (t) is r 0,tr (t) filtered by the low-pass filter,ñ(t) is a zero-mean Gaussian noise with power spectral density
2 , and H(f ) is the frequency response of the filter.
A. Legitimate Receiver
Knowing the sequence (c 0,0 , c 0,1 , ...) indicating the separations between the reference pulses and the data pulses, the legitimate UWB TR receiver correlates the filtered received signalr 0,tr (t) with its delayed versionr 0,tr (t − D − c 0, k/m T p ) in the kth frame and sums over all frames; that is, the integrator output corresponding to the first symbol period is given by:
The error probability of the legitimate UWB TR receiver conditioned upon {h l } L−1 l=0 according to the Gaussian approximation can be derived in [7] and thus the decoding error probability of the legitimate UWB TR receiver when averaged over the multipath channel becomes:
Note that this receiver obtains this performance without requiring knowledge of the random offsets τ k .
B. Adversary
We assume that the true random τ k offsets keep the adversary from doing channel estimation based on methods such as template averaging [11] . Thus, the UWB TR adversary, lacking knowledge of the delay D + c 0, k/m T p between the reference and data pulses but with knowledge of the data bit b 0 , correlates the filtered received signalr 0,tr (t) with the delayed version (−1) 
The decision statistic y 0,i can be approximated as a Gaussian random variable as suggested in [7] , [13] . The adversary selects the index of the delay corresponding to the largest correlator output. As in the coherent case, a more sophisticated hypothesis test could be performed, but, in the TR case, this is further complicated and gains limited because of the lack of knowledge of the channel. Noting
0, otherwise and
the probability for finding the separation employed by the TR system in the first group of N f /m frames is found in an analogous fashion to (10):
Thus, the probability of the TR adversary not being able to determine the key over multipath channels is: Fig. 3 . Comparison of security tradeoffs of UWB system intended for coherent reception and TR system in IEEE 802.15.4a LOS office environments. The x-axis denotes in log scale the error probability of the legitimate receivers in decoding the data bit while the y-axis denotes in log scale the probability of the adversaries correctly determining the key. At the same error probability for the legitimate receivers, the adversary in the coherent reception case is more effective. Fig. 4 . Comparison of security tradeoffs of UWB system intended for coherent reception and TR system in IEEE 802.15.4a LOS outdoor environments. The x-axis denotes in log scale the error probability of the legitimate receivers in decoding the data bit while the y-axis denotes in log scale the probability of the adversaries correctly determining the key. At the same error probability for the legitimate receivers, the adversary in the coherent reception case is more effective.
V. SEMI-ANALYTIC SIMULATIONS
The tradeoffs in performance of the legitimate receiver and the adversary for both coherent and TR reception are considered. For these plots, the received SNR is assumed to be the same at the intended receiver and the adversary. We consider the problem of a near adversary and far receiver below. IEEE 802.15.4a channel models [6] are considered.
Figs. 3 and 4 illustrate the security tradeoffs of the UWB systems when the proposed signaling schemes are used under IEEE 802.15.4a LOS office and LOS outdoor channel models, respectively. For the simulation parameters, we utilize a 30-bit secret key and divide it into 5 parts (m=5). Assume a low-data rate application of 100 Kbps. Each symbol period of 10 μs consists of 25 frames, each being 400 ns long. Therefore, each set of 6 bits is independently used to identify the pulse locations in the corresponding group of 5 frames. The bandwidth is 8 GHz yielding a pulse width of approximately 125 ps. For the simulation of the UWB TR system, we assume that D is fixed at 100 ns to assure no inter-pulse interference.
From the figures, the error probability of the difficult hypothesis test for the adversary is much worse than that of the legitimate receiver in both the system intended for coherent reception and the TR system. This is expected since finding the time slots with the randomly assigned data pulses is very difficult for adversaries without first learning the bbit secret key. Note that the difficulty of the hypothesis test is caused not only by the large number of hypotheses, but also by the ringing of the UWB channel, which makes it difficult to separate hypotheses. Interestingly, both Figs. 3 and 4 demonstrate that the baseline UWB TR scheme provides better security than the baseline coherent UWB scheme. For example, at the low signal-to-noise (SNR) range in Fig. 3 , when the error probability of the legitimate receivers in both systems is 10 −2 , the error probabilities of the adversaries in the UWB system intended for coherent reception and UWB TR system are approximately 1 − 10 −4 and 1 − 10 −6 , respectively. The error probabilities of the legitimate receiver and adversary in the systems intended for coherent reception (7), (11) are not affected by the bandwidth W , whereas the error probabilities of the legitimate receiver and adversary in the TR systems (14) , (17) are functions of the bandwidth W . The numerical results obtained by varying the bandwidth W show that the larger the bandwidth W used, the higher the probability of error for the adversary of TR reception, resulting in better security performance for the UWB TR systems.
VI. DISCUSSION

1) Near-far Problem:
One challenge to all physical-layer security protocols is the near-far problem. In particular, an eavesdropper near the transmitter can have a significant SNR advantage over the desired receiver. More troubling is that one often cannot assume knowledge of the receiver position and thus it is difficult to even choose the secrecy rate at which all of the recent schemes based on [14] should transmit. Hence, it is desirable to consider how robust the proposed schemes of fixed rate are for eavesdroppers that have significant SNR advantages over the desired receiver. Further numerical results (not shown) demonstrate it is very difficult for adversaries to detect a transmitted signal over a large SNR range. In particular, even when the received SNR of the desired receiver is driven very high (corresponding to extremely low probabilities of error), the minimum error probability of the adversary is still high. This demonstrates that even when an adversary is near the transmitter while a legitimate receiver is located distantly from the transmitter, the adversary will have difficulty in detecting the transmitted signal. This complication for the adversary comes from the long "ringing" of the UWB channel, which is particularly hard for the adversary to deal with, even with sophisticated receivers, in the TR case. Longer keys and wider bandwidths will also improve this promising near-far resiliency.
2) Comments on the Comparison and Improvement of Each Scheme:
The comparison provided in this paper considers only baseline systems and thus should be carefully considered before making firm decisions on eventual utility. Here we comment on this comparison and future directions for improving each of the systems.
First, consider each of the systems when the adversary employs a more complicated hypothesis test that takes into account the confusion of the hypotheses caused by the channel. For the system intended for coherent reception, it is relatively straightforward for the UWB adversary to use the equations presented in this paper to conduct such a hypothesis test, although we could complicate this somewhat with a more complicated mapping to pulse locations from the key bits. However, since the UWB TR adversary is not able to estimate the channel parameters, it would be much harder for the adversary to perform such a hypothesis test from the analogous set of equations in that case.
We also have assumed perfect timing for both the receiver and the adversary in both the system intended for coherent reception and in the TR system. In the system intended for coherent reception, this is reasonable since the assumed beacons easily provide such. However, in a TR system, the reader and adversary would have to perform such. Since the TR system knows the key, this is a standard exercise, but the adversary would have a much more difficult task to figure out not only symbol boundaries, but also the locations where the system switches from one part of the key to another.
Finally, we are considering future enhancements that will facilitate improvement on the baseline systems employing coherent and reference-based reception. One could easily argue that the comparison here is not fair to the coherent system, since a given tradeoff on its performance curves in Figures 3 and 4 might come at a lower transmit power than the one compared to on the TR curve. Increasing the pulse power in the coherent system to try to equalize such does not help, because it just moves one along the performance curves in Figures 3 and 4 . However, there are multiple possibilities to employ excess power. One potential scheme is to produce dummy pulses in some of the frames to confuse the adversary. The adversary would be just as likely to choose a dummy pulse as the real one, and the reader would only be mildly affected by inter-pulse interference on the pulse in which it is interested. One other possible improvement being considered is to remove the frame structure in both the UWB coherent and TR signaling models. In UWB coherent signaling, pulses can be placed anywhere in one symbol period based on the entire secret key. In UWB TR signaling, the key could be mapped to a tuning of the autocorrelation function of the transmitted signal across an entire symbol period. Doing so in either signaling scheme makes it more challenging for the adversary to detect pulses because of the expanded search space.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed a UWB signaling model to strengthen physical layer security. We examined the security performance of both baseline coherent and TR signaling schemes numerically in IEEE 802.15.4a environments. These numerical results demonstrate that, for the baseline systems considered, the security performance of the TR system is better than that of the system intended for coherent reception. There are numerous ways in which each of the schemes can be improved and many adversary models that can be adopted. We are currently pursuing such in conjunction with lightweight cryptographic protocols to be employed over the UWB system. We hope this paper also motivates further work of others in this important area.
